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This paper studies the urban land market in China in 2003—2007. In China, all urban land is owned
by the state. Leasehold use rights for land for (re)development are sold by city governments and are
a key source of city revenue. Leasehold sales are viewed as a major venue for corruption, prompting
a number of reforms over the years. Reforms now require all leasehold rights be sold at public auction.
There are two main types of auction: regular English auction and an unusual type which we call a
“two stage auction”. The latter type of auction seems more subject to corruption, and to side deals
between potential bidders and the auctioneer. Absent corruption, theory suggests that two stage auctions
would most likely maximize sales revenue for properties which are likely to have relatively few bidders,
or are “cold”, which would suggest negative selection on property unobservables into such auctions.
However, if such auctions are more corruptible, that could involve positive selection as city officials
divert hotter properties to a more corruptible auction form. The paper finds that, overall, sales prices
are lower for two stage auctions, and there is strong evidence of positive selection. The price difference
is explained primarily by the fact that two stage auctions typically have just one bidder, or no competition
despite the vibrant land market in Chinese cities.
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zhangq@gsm.pku.edu.cnThis paper studies the urban land market in China in 2003-2007. Urban land is 
owned “by the people” and its allocation done by the state.
1 In most cities, the local land 
bureau is responsible for the vast majority of allocations of land, allocated through 
auction sales of leasehold rights.
2 In China, land markets have been viewed as very 
corrupt, prompting a number of reforms over the years. We will provide some 
institutional context below but a couple of quotes illustrate that corruption is an on-going 
issue. In 2004, the China Daily wrote 
“China’s Ministry of Lands and Resources announced new measures to crack 
down on corruption and inefficiency in the land sector. The new rules forbid 
officials to receive personal benefits from parties under their administration 
[italics added]. It is estimated that in 2003, the country faced 168,000 violations 
of its Land Law.” 
 
Yet in June 2008, the Asian Times reported 
 
“Chinese government efforts to clean up land sales, a major source of official 
corruption…, face a rethink.   
…Illegal transfers, corruption in land deals,…are rampant in major cities, according 
to an investigation published by the National Audit Office (NAO) last week. 
 …Governments in the 11 cities [studied by the NAO], including Beijing and 
Shanghai, were also found to have misused 8.4 billion yuan from land-grant fees, 
Zhai Aicai, of the NAO, said in the report.     
….Some cities have given a flexible interpretation to the rules and the auction system 
has often existed in name only, resulting in a lack of competition among developers 
and the winning developer being able to secure the land at below its true market 
value.”  
 
Today, after considerable reform, leaseholds are, in principle, all sold at public 
auction. There are two main types of auction in most cities: regular English auction and 
an unusual type of auction which we call a “two stage auction.”  The raw data suggest 
that leaseholds sold at two stage auctions sell at steep price discounts, relative to English 
auctions. Why are there such sales price differentials; and, related, how do city officials 
choose auction type for any particular property? Absent corruption, in terms of 
maximizing expected sales revenue, the paper argues that two stage auctions would be 
best for properties which are likely to have relatively few bidders, or are “cold.” 
                                                 
1 Rural land is owned by the village and allocations done by the village leadership. 
2 The central government (national asset committee) and the military may control portions of city land in 
particular cases, as for example the national capital Beijing. 
  2Allocating cold properties to two stage auctions would suggest negative selection on 
property unobservables, and would be one possible explanation for the price differential 
between the auction types. However estimation suggests that selection on unobservables 
into two stage auctions is in fact positive. The paper argues that two stage auctions are 
more corruptible, which would explain positive selection, as city officials divert “hot” 
properties to the more corruptible auction form. Consistent with how we think the 
corruption process works, much of the price differential between auction types seems to 
be explained by the fact that two stage auctions are much more likely to have just one 
bidder, or no competition, despite their benefiting from positive selection on 
unobservables and despite the vibrant land market in Chinese cities.  
The paper is organized as follows. We start with essential background information on 
Chinese land markets and especially the two auction formats. We then present a 
conceptual framework to model the key differences between the auction formats. In 
section 3, we discuss the data and patterns in the data. Section 4 estimates a reduced form 
model of price differences between the two auction types, and discusses instruments for 
auction type used to estimate selection into auction type. In Sections 5 and 6 we split the 
analysis of price differences into its two key components, accounting for joint selection 
into auction type and competition: whether a property is likely to sell competitively or not 
depending on auction type; and whether there are price differences across auction types, 
conditional on a property selling competitively.  
 
1.  Background 
In the Maoist era and in the early reform years after 1978, land allocations were done by 
the state, with no market mechanisms involved. Starting in 1986, land administration 
changed with major reforms over the years (Ding and Knapp 2005, Valetta 2005). The 
first change was to charge new users for development rights and some incumbent users 
for use rights. After 1988, use rights for vacant land in the city were allocated through 
leaseholds, where, for a fixed sum, users obtained a long lease for a specified use (e.g., 70 
years for residential land), subject to restrictions on intensity of development. In the 
1990’s, many of these allocations were done by “negotiation” in a hidden process, where 
  3reportedly leaseholds were often sold for a tiny fraction of market value. This had two 
consequences.  
First, leasehold sales are a major source of revenue for many cities, in essence 
potentially being a full Henry George tax, allocating all “surplus” land rents to the city. 
For example, in 2004 and 2005 for Chengdu, Suzhou and Chongqing, leasehold sales 
revenues ranged from 2.6% to 5% of local GDP. Cities have an expenditure budget and 
on-the-book revenue sources. On-the-book revenues account for about 70% of total 
expenditures. Leasehold sales revenues are mostly off-the-book revenues, which are used 
to effectively close the on-the-book deficit. Negotiated sales at well below market prices 
deprived cities of major revenues.  
Second, negotiated sales were reportedly inherently corrupt, resulting in some 
indictments of corrupt officials and a variety of reforms, one of which in 2004 was 
quoted above. Another reform in 2002 banned the secondary market for “land 
development rights,” which had allowed large traditional holders (e.g., state owned 
enterprises) to, in effect, privately sell off their own land use rights (Zhu, 2004, 2005). 
Today the local land bureau is supposed to be in charge of almost all allocations of land 
for (re)development. Finally and most critically for this paper, a third recent reform was a 
2002 law which banned negotiated sales by the land bureau, with the last date for any 
negotiated sales being August 31, 2004. For the last 4 years at least, all urban land 
leasehold sales are to be done through public auctions, with details of all transactions 
posted to the public on the internet. 
How does the land market work? Local land use planning is done by an 
independent committee (albeit with 1-2 representatives from the land bureau on the 
committee). Given the overall land use plan for the city, at the beginning of each year, 
annual allocations are planned, based on existing urban land and converted rural land 
which should be ready for redevelopment during that year. Each plot of land is large 
with, in our sample, a median area of 22,300 square meters and a median sales price of 
USD $7 – 8 million.  The committee decides the use and other constraints (like floor-area 
ratio) of each plot to be sold. Once the land becomes available during the year, the 
committee sets the reserve price, using a formula based on the appraised value submitted 
by, in principle, independent appraisal companies. Then the land is turned over to the 
  4land bureau which prepares it for sale (land for redevelopment in principle should be 
cleared), and chooses an auction type. 
There are three types of auction used in China’s land market. About 97% of sales in 
major cities are accounted for by two auction types, with the third type generally 
appearing only in Beijing and Shanghai. We ignore this third type of auction and our 
econometric specifications exclude Beijing and Shanghai.
3 The two main types are 
guapai auction which we call two stage auction and paimai which is an English auction. 
English auctions are standard ascending auctions, usually publicly announced 20 working 
days before the auction. At announcement, basic details (e.g., use restrictions, reserve 
price, location) are publicized; and potential bidders for a small fee can obtain more 
detailed information, as well as inspect the site. Participation requires a cash deposit, 
usually about 10% of the reserve price, which is a non-trivial requirement given the large 
sizes and sales prices of such properties. English auctions are quite public, often video-
taped with the press present. Winning bidders in principle must develop the land 
themselves. 
As with English auctions, two stage auctions are announced about 20 working days 
in advance; details of the plot are made public; and a deposit is required upon 
participation in the auction. A key difference is the auction format. With this type of 
auction, there are two stages. The first stage normally lasts 10 working days after the 
auction starts. In the second stage, at the end of the 10 working days, if more than one 
bidder is competing for the property, the auction ends on the spot with an English auction 
where only active bidders in the first stage are allowed to participate. If there is an ending 
English auction, it is generally less public than regular English auctions. In the first stage 
                                                 
3 The third type is sealed bid, or zhaobiao auction. There, bidders submit sealed bids to the land bureau, 
which decides the winner according to a complicated score function, in which the submitted bid usually 
accounts for only 20-30% in weight.  The remaining 70-80% of the weight goes to the credibility of the 
bidder and how much social responsibility the bidder is willing to take. Credibility is mainly reflected in 
two aspects: one is the quality and reputation of the projects the bidder has developed in the past; the other 
is the bidder’s financial capacity. As for social responsibility, this arises from Beijing’s recent attempt to 
curb rising housing prices. If a bidder is willing to commit to an upper bound on the housing price of the 
future development on this piece of land, then this bidder will get a higher score in terms of social 
responsibility. In a logit framework in looking at auction choices, we did an early test on the validity of the 
IIA assumption that dropping this third auction type does not affect the analysis of the choice between 
English and two stage auctions (Hausman-test of coefficient differences, when zhaobiao is added as a 
choice versus excluded). We could not reject the validity of the IIA assumption. 
 
 
  5during the 10 working days between the starting date of the auction and the potential 
ending English auction, after obtaining qualification, people may submit ascending bids 
in person or on-line. Bids as they arrive are immediately posted on the trading board of 
the land bureau, as well as typically on the internet, although the identity of bidders is not 
posted. If, at the end of 10 working days, there is only one remaining bidder, that bidder 
is assigned the property at his bid price (but not less than the reserve price). Otherwise, 
with competition, the auction is converted to an English auction. 
 We will argue this first stage of a two stage auction allows for signaling of 
valuations for purposes of entry deterrence in non-corrupt contexts and for signaling in a 
potentially corrupt context, where the auction will be dominated by a corrupt bidder (in 
league with the land bureau).
4 There are two fuzzy parts to the two stage auction format 
which we will argue are consistent with signaling, especially under corruption. While the 
auction is announced about 20 working days in advance, the exact date of the start of the 
first stage of the auction may not be announced at that time, but rather at an unspecified 
later date. Second, while bidders can apply during the announcement period before the 
first stage starts, it appears that approvals to participate can be delayed until after the first 
stage is under way. 
As detailed below, we use data on 2302 auction transactions from 2003 to 2007 in 15 
cities, which use both auction types (as opposed to having only two stage auctions). In 
these cities English auctions account for 28% of auctions. In Figures 1 and 2 we present 
the indications from raw data that properties sell at a higher price under English as 
opposed to two stage auctions, and that English auctions are much more likely to be 
competitive. Figure 1 shows the distribution of unit sales price (price per sq. meter), by 
auction type for the sample; and Figure 2 shows the distribution of the ratio of sales to 
reserve prices. The raw data suggest that the distribution of unit sales prices for English 
auctions is shifted to the right of that for two stage auctions. Of course, the distribution of 
raw unit sales prices does not condition on property and market characteristics. While 
                                                 
4 We conducted surveys of the land bureau officials of 20 cities covered in our sample. In our survey, we 
asked questions regarding the differences in the mechanism between the two auction formats, in addition to 
differences in the pattern of bidding behaviors. We also asked how the land bureau chooses between the 
two auction formats for each piece of land for sale.  Our theory conjectures in the next section are informed 
by our survey findings.  
  6differentials in property characteristics could explain price differentials across auction 
types, below we show that will turn out not to be the case. 
In Figure 2, two stage auctions tend to be massed much more around 1.0 for 
“spread”, which is the ratio of sales to reserve prices. Both conceptually and in a 
particular sub-sample analyzed below where we know the number of bidders, a ratio of 1 
implies that there is just one bidder and thus no competition. Ratios larger than 1 in the 
sub-sample imply multiple bidders and what we term a competitive auction. Of course, 
whether there is competition or not is influenced by reserve price; so, if there are 
differentials in setting reserve prices across auction types, that might explain the 
differential pattern by auction type in Figure 2. However, reserve prices are set by the 
outside committee before the choice of auction type by the land bureau; and, as we will 
see below in Table 4, reserve prices do not seem to affect the choice of auction type.
5 
Assuming that reserve prices are some fraction of an assessor’s estimate of true market 
value, a lack of competition is very surprising on its own. In these cities, auctions occur 
in a setting of rapid urban growth, with per capita urban incomes growing at about 10% a 
year and local population at 3-4 % a year. Given national restrictions on conversion of 
rural to urban land at the city fringes, this suggests there should be a high demand for 
land for new development.  
In the next section we outline a simple conceptual framework, which discusses 
our empirical hypotheses and the framework behind them. In the following sections, we 
turn to the econometric formulation looking at auction choices, sales prices, and the 
degree of competition. We document and explore the price differences between English 
and two stage auctions. As already noted a key issue concerns selection of properties into 
auction type and whether properties with better unobservables are more (positive 




                                                 
5 As further evidence that reserve prices are set independently of auction type, in a MLE Heckman selection 
model where we allow auction type to be a determinant of reserve price, controlling for selection effects of 
auction type yields an insignificant rho, suggesting no correlation between those unobservables affecting 
auction choice and those affecting reserve price.  
  72. Conceptual framework 
We have not fully solved a theoretical model which covers all key aspects, for reasons 
that will become apparent. Rather we discuss the elements that are relevant and try to 
draw reasonable conjectures. We start with a discussion of how the two auction formats 
might be modeled in a world without corruption and how the choice of format affects 
outcomes. Then we ask how corruption possibilities might have differential implications 
for the two formats. Finally we discuss the land bureau’s choice of auction format.  
Assume for a leasehold auction there are N potential bidders, of which some 
endogenous number n pay an entry fee, C, and become active bidders.
6 A key issue is 
how the choice of auction format may influence n.  We assume auctions are independent 
private valuation. Specifically, a potential bidder i’s valuation is  0 i Vvv i = + , where  0 v  
is the (expected) common value that is the same for every bidder (based on property 
characteristics and local market conditions) and  i v  is the private value component only 
known to bidder i.  i v ’s are i.i.d. 
7
We make the standard assumption that all bidders are risk neutral and maximize 
their expected payoff. Let  i VF ( V ∝ ) on  0 [,] vV  be the distribution function of the bidder 
i’s valuation, and let  f(V) be the associated density function. A bidder’s payoff when 
winning the auction with a bid  i B is  iii U= V B C − − . 
2.1 English auction. 
Since an English auction is outcome-equivalent to a second price Vickery auction, our 
setting is equivalent to that of Tan and Yilankaya (2006), who analyze a simultaneous 
move entry game in a second price auction with independent price valuations and 
participation costs. In a symmetric equilibrium of such a model a bidder will decide to 
enter the auction if and only if his valuation is above a certain value ˆ V>r+ C, where  r 
is the reserve price and C is the entry cost. For a bidder with valuation exactly equal to 
ˆ V , the only way he can get positive rent from entering the auction is if he is the lone 
                                                 
6 The entry fee consists of (i) cost of making cash deposit to qualify, (ii) cost of preparing documents to 
meet the qualification requirements, (iii) other transaction costs  (e.g., time, consulting fee). 
 
7 Note that we assume the (expected) common value is common knowledge to all participants, thus the 
auction is treated as one with independent private valuation.  
  8bidder in the auction, in which case he gets a rent of  ˆ Vr − . This case happens with 
probability 
1 ˆ N F(V)
− , such that all other potential bidders have valuations below  ˆ V . 
Therefore, the valuation threshold for entry  ˆ V  must satisfy 
 
                             
1 ˆˆ N F(V) (V r)=C
− − .                   (1) 
From equation (1), we can solve for the valuation threshold for entry  ˆ V  in equilibrium 
that depends on  . (r,C, N,V)  Clearly,  ˆ V  is increasing in r,C, N .  
 The probability of selling at the reserve price is 
1 ˆˆ 1
N NF(V) [ F(V)]
− − . Other 
possible outcomes in the auction are (1) that there are no bidders, which occurs with 
probability  ˆ ()
N FV ; and (2) that there are two or more bidders, so the auction is 
competitive with the winner being the highest valuation participant, j, who pays the 
second highest valuation  2 ()
n
j X V  and makes an ex post rent  2 ()
n
j j VX V − . One can derive 
expected rents of entrants and expected revenue from the auction
8 . 
2.2 Two stage auction 
The two stage auction adds a first stage in which bidders in arbitrary pre-determined 
sequence (say, the time at which they learn of the auction) decide whether to enter the 
auction with a bid. Absent of entry fee (so every potential bidder will enter), there is no 
benefit of bidding early (e.g., see the last minute bidding literature such as Ockenfels and 
Roth, 2002). With entry fee, the advantage of bidding early is that a bidder can 
                                                 
8  In the bidding stage, each active bidder’s valuation has the truncated density function of 
ˆ () () / [ 1 () ] g Vf V F V =− on ˆ [, ] VV. Let the associated distribution function be () GV .  Then the expected 
rent for active bidder i  from the bidding game is  2 () [ () ] ( )
n
ni i i i uV V XV d G V − =− ∫∫∫ , where  () i GV −  denotes 
the joint distribution of other  1 n−  active bidders over the domain of  
1 ˆ [, ]
n
i VV
− . In the entry stage, bidder 
i  with valuation  ˆ [, ] i VV V ∈  expects that the number of active bidders (including himself) is 
1, 2, . . ., n = N  with probability of 
1
1 ˆ () [ 1 () ]
Nn Nn n
nN p C FV FV ˆ − −−




−  denotes the 
combination of  Nn − out of  1 N − .  Thus, the total expected rent for bidder i  with valuation  ˆ (, ) i VV V ∈  
from entering the auction is 
1 () ()
N
ii n ni n UV p uV
= =∑ . Expected revenue is 
1
12 2
ˆˆ () [ 1 () ] ( )
N Nn
nn n ER NF V F V r p X dG V
−




  9potentially signal that she drew a relatively high private valuation; we will suggest that 
the bid will signal her actual valuation. The point of the signal is to discourage future 
potential entrants who might have drawn somewhat higher valuations from entering the 
auction. For future bidders with somewhat higher valuations, they now know that, if they 
enter, the prior signaler is prepared to bid up to her valuation. That inferred valuation 
then defines the minimum price they have to pay. So their expected rent is based on the 
likelihood that they will win (no future entrants will have an even higher bid) and on the 
ex post rent (their valuation minus the current signaler’s valuation).  Solving the general 
case with endogenous first stage entry sequence is daunting—whether an early entrant 
signals with what bid function, whether later entrants with higher valuations enter or not, 
and the complicated interactions between early and later signalers. 
Example. 
We illustrate the setting with a simple example. Suppose only one randomly selected 
person has the option to bid early and we consider a possible separating signaling 
equilibrium. Suppose bidder 1 chooses to enter in stage 1 by using a strictly increasing 
bidding schedule  1 B(V ) when her valuation is  1 [, ] . VV V ∈   For  1 , VV <  bidder 1 will 
choose to not enter the auction.  
Suppose her valuation is exactly V  . Based on the Riley argument in the signaling 
literature, bidder 1 should use the lowest possible signal, the reserve price r . Moreover, 
in order for bidder 1 not to choose this signal when her valuation is just below V,  her 
expected payoff from entering and signaling must be zero. Once bidder 1 reveals that her 
valuation is V,  other potential bidders will enter only if their valuation is above  ˆ
S V (V)  , 
the solution to equation (1) with V   replacing r  and  2 N −  replacing 1 N − .   Other 
potential bidders understand that to win they must outbid bidder 1; but since bidder 1 has 
committed to enter the auction, she is willing to bid all the way to  1 V . Thus, for the other 
potential bidders, the effective reserve price increases to  1 V . Bidder 1 can win the auction 
only if no other potential bidders enter the auction, which happens with probability of 
1 ˆ N
S F(V (V))
−  . Therefore, we must have 
 
  101 ˆ N
S F(V (V)) (V r) C
− − =  .       ( 2 )    
Note that since  ˆ
S V( V ) > V+ C  , comparing (2) and (1) reveals that V   is significantly 
smaller than  ˆ. V  
In the bidding game if bidder 1 does not enter in the first stage, the other  1 N −  
potential bidders play the same game as in an English auction: they first decide on 
whether to enter in the second stage simultaneously, and then the active bidders bid in the 
English auction. Exactly as above, we can solve for the valuation threshold for entry, 
denoted by  ˆˆ 1, . NS V= V ( r , C , N V ) −  Note that  ˆ V  is increasing inN , thus 
ˆˆ
NS V <V(r,C, N,V), which is the equilibrium entry threshold in the case of an English 
auction with N  potential bidders.    
  In the Appendix, we show that if bidder 1 has valuation 1 [, ] VV V ∈  , he has a 
bidding function that is strictly increasing in  1 V  and truthfully reveals his valuation. Such 
a bidding function satisfies the single crossing property, so it isn’t beneficial for lower 
valuation bidders to pretend to be higher types.  
Comparison: English versus two stage auction 
Since  ˆ V< V   and  ˆ
NS V< V ˆ , the probability of no sale is lower in a two stage auction than 
in an English auction. Since bidder 1 can discourage entry by other potential bidders with 
his early bid, he is more likely to enter in a two stage auction than in an English auction. 
And when bidder 1 does not enter, other bidders still are more likely to enter a two stage 
auction than an English auction. The intuition is that the simultaneous entry game in an 
English auction suffers from coordination failure: one bidder’s entry creates a negative 
externality for others. Thus, bidders may not enter the auction even when their valuation 
is significantly higher than the reserve price plus entry cost, for fear of being outbid by 
others. In contrast, bidder 1 in the sequential entry game of a two stage auction does not 
suffer from negative externalities from other bidders, thus having a stronger incentive to 
enter the auction.  The flip side of this is that the probability of competitive bidding (two 
or more active bidders) is lower in a two stage auction than in an English auction, 
because the early entrant may deter later entrants.  
  11In terms of expected revenue, the comparison between two stage and English 
auctions is ambiguous in general. The intuition is that while a two stage auction has a 
higher probability of sale, the likelihood of competitive bidding is smaller than in an 
English auction. Thus, depending on parameter values, the expected revenue of the two 
stage auction can be greater or smaller than that of an English auction. 
In the Appendix, we show in a numerical example that the expected revenue of a 
two stage auction is greater than that of an English auction when V is low, and vice versa. 
We conjecture that when land is “cold,” in the sense that the valuation is likely to be low 
( e.g., low V ) or the potential demand (N ) is small, a sale and some revenue is more 
likely under a two stage auction. We note N  is unobserved in our data (as is V ). With 
cold properties which in an English auction might generate no active bidders, a two stage 
auction may generally be a better choice of auction for a revenue-maximizing land 
bureau, since the threshold valuations for entry are lower. If land is “hot” so an English 
auction is likely to attract many bidders, English auctions will tend to generate more 
revenue since two stage auctions may lead to entry deterrence. Thus we might expect a 
revenue-maximizing land bureau to steer hot properties towards English auctions. Thus 
overall, there would be negative selection on unobservables into two stage auctions.   
2.3 Effect of corruption 
Suppose corruption arises in the following way. Under a corrupt sale, a government 
official reaches an implicit agreement with a particular developer, say, developer 1, so 
that if he wins the land auction, she will provide special help (which could include 
weaker enforcement of development constraints or greater government investment in 
relevant infrastructure), in exchange for a bribery payment. Let Q be the value of the 
government official’s help to developer 1, and let qQ ≤  be the bribery payment 
developer 1 makes to the government official, if he wins the auction. Define κ Qq ≡−  as 
the net benefit to developer 1 from having an under-the-table deal with the government 
official.  
Assume the corrupt government official’s payoff function is given by ER+λq, 
where ER is the expected revenue from the land auction (that goes to the city coffers) 
and λ  measures how corrupt the government official is. When  0 λ=,  the government 
  12official is non-corrupt, as in the situation we discussed above. When  λ  becomes larger, 
the government official cares more about her own bribery income and less about the 
city’s fiscal revenue. Assume the government official is corrupt with probability of  p . 
This depends on the likelihood the government official in charge of the land is 
intrinsically corrupt and the likelihood that she has a “partner” developer who is 
interested in the land and they trust each other. If the government official is corrupt, only 
she and her partner developer know about their implicit agreement; no other potential 
bidders know about it. The only thing the other potential bidders know is that with 
probability  p  the government official and a developer have an under-the-table deal. 
What might be the impact of such corruption under the two auction formats? 
English auction 
Under an English auction, all potential bidders make entry decisions simultaneously in 
the entry stage and then the active bidders make bidding decisions in the auction stage. 
Let bidder 1 be the potential partner developer with the government official, so with 
probability of  p  her total valuation is  1 V+ κ , and with probability of 1 p −  her valuation 
is  1 V.   Let  1P ˆ V  be the valuation threshold for entry for bidder 1, and let  1 ˆ V−  be the 
valuation threshold for entry for all other bidders.  
  With the possibility that bidder 1 is corrupt, bidders make entry decisions in an 




11 p 1 1 1 1 p 1
1p 1 1
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ {1
ˆˆ ˆ [ 1 ]( )}                                                 (3)
N F(V ) p[ F(V )][V E(V |V [V ,V κ]) κ]




−− ∈ − −
−− =
 
where the bracketed expression on the left hand side represents a non-corrupt bidder’s 
expected rent (conditional on there being no other active non-corrupt bidder) in each of 
three cases: (1) he outbids the corrupt bidder 1; (2) the corrupt bidder 1 does not enter; 
and (3) bidder 1 is not corrupt and does not enter.  Note that the above equation assumes 
  13that if bidder 1 is not corrupt, he acts like any other bidder by using the same entry 
strategy.






p q FV V r w C κ
− −
− = q + −+ = ∑        (4) 
where  q w  is bidder 1’s expected rent when his valuation is  1 ˆ
P V κ +  and there are q other 
bidders whose valuations are above  1 ˆ V− but less than  1 ˆ
P V κ + .  
It can be shown that in equilibrium,  11 ˆˆ ˆ
P VV V − << , where  ˆ V  is the entry threshold 
we solved in the previous section.
10 The reason is as follows. Thanks to the favor from 
the government official, the corrupt developer 1 can afford bidding more aggressively 
and thus has a better chance of winning the auction. So she is more likely to enter. Facing 
the possibility that bidder 1 may be favored, the other potential bidders are less likely to 
win and thus are less likely to enter.  
Two stage auction 
In the two stage auction, if the government official is corrupt and has reached an implicit 
agreement with her partner developer, bidder 1, he should know about the auction 
beforehand and can act right after it is started. Since both would like to let all other 
potential bidders know that this land is “claimed,” a simple and natural way to send that 
signal is for bidder 1 to obtain qualification quickly (potentially with the government 
official’s help) and make a bid right after the auction is started, before other potential 
bidders are granted qualification to bid, and perhaps even before they know that the 
auction has actually started. Since bidder 1 is only signaling that he has the agreement 
                                                 
9 This assumption holds when ex ante no one knows the identity of the potentially corrupt bidder, so that all 
potential bidders are symmetric if the government official is not corrupt. If everyone knows that bidder 1 is 
the only possible developer who can have a deal with government official, he is more likely to enter than 
other bidders (having a lower threshold) even when in fact he does not have a deal. This is because only 
bidder 1 knows that no one else is corrupt and all other bidders are worried that bidder 1 is corrupt. This 
latter case is not that realistic and the analysis will not change much if we allow for this possibility.  
10 Clearly by comparing equations (3) and (4) we must have 11 ˆˆ
p VV − < . If  11 ˆˆ
p VVκ − ≥+ , then equation (4) 
implies that  (note that all  ’s are zero). If  1 ˆ VV − > ˆ
q w 11 ˆˆ
p VVκ − < + , then equation (3) implies that 
(note that the first term in the bracket is zero). Comparing equations (1) and (4) reveals that if  1 ˆ VV − > ˆ
1 ˆ VV − ≥ ˆ , then  1 ˆˆ
p VV < .  
 
  14with the government official, bidder 1 only needs to signal that, by bidding just the 
reserve price (to increase the rent from winning the auction). When κ is relatively larg
such signaling by bidder 1, if believed by other bidders, will ser
e, 





d s   
idders since they see little hope of outbidding bidder 1.  
If a bid at the reserve price submitted right after the auction start date is perceive
as a signal of having an insider agreement, a bidder without such an agreement may be
tempted to mimic such behavior to scare away other bidders. However, this snapping 
strategy is not likely to work, even if the snapper knows the time when the auction st
and is granted qualification in advance. If the snapper manages to make a bid at the 
reserve price before the true corrupt  eveloper, the latter i likely to make a higher bid in
order to reclaim the land as long as  p is close to one and κ is relatively large. In such
case, the snapper will lose the auction and waste
 a 
 his entry cost. In the Appendix, we 
lustra il te this argument in a simple example.
11  
  We consider the following equilibrium. Let  C V    be the minimum threshold in 
which bidder 1 will send a signal by bidding the reserve price. If seeing that bidder 1 b
at the reserve price right after the auction is announced her potential bidders 
understand that bidder 1’s valuation is
ids 
, all the ot
  1+ κ , where  V 1 [, ] C VV V ∈  .  Then they decide 
simultaneously whether to enter. Let  0 V   be the valuation threshold for all other potential 
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11 Even if a non-corrupt bidder will try the snapping strategy, he will do so only when his valuation is very 
high for fear of being outbid by a corrupt bidder. It is possible that in equilibrium, a non-corrupt bidder 
with very high valuation and a corrupt bidder are pooled in using the same strategy of bidding at the reserve 
price at the start of the auction (whoever manages to be the first is immaterial). In such an equilibrium, a 
corrupt bidder who does not get the chance to submit a first bid will try to outbid the non-corrupt bidder 
only when he also has a quite high valuation. What is important, however, is that in such a pooling 
equilibrium, other bidders are seriously discouraged to enter, either by a very high valuation non-corrupt 
bidder or by a corrupt bidder.  
12 This assumes that, when their valuations are sufficiently high, other non-corrupt bidders may still enter 
the auction after seeing that corrupt bidder 1 has entered. Otherwise, the corrupt bidder 1’s signaling can 
completely prevent entry by other bidders, and the difference between the English and two stage auctions in 
terms of entry will be larger.   
  15And  C V   must satisfy an equation similar to equation (4) with  C V   replacing  1P ˆ V  and  0 V   
replacing  1 ˆ V− . Below we argue that this entry threshold for other bidders in a two stage 
auction,  0 V  , is greater than that under an English auction. 
  When no one bids at the reserve price right after the auction is announced, then 
bidders understand that the government official is not corrupt. In this case our previous 
analysis of the two stage auction under no corruption is valid.  
Comparison of English and two stage auctions under corruption 
It can be verified that upon seeing a first day bid at the reserve price, all other potential 
bidders’ valuation threshold for entry  0 V    in a two stage auction will be significantly 
greater than the threshold in the case of an English auction,  1 ˆ V− .
13  This occurs because in 
the case of an English auction, the other potential bidders do not know whether bidder 1 
is corrupt. They only know that he is corrupt with probability p .  However, in the two 
stage auction, the other potential bidders know for sure whether bidder 1 is corrupt or not. 
When he is corrupt, the other potential bidders have a much smaller chance of winning 
the auction since bidder 1 has substantial advantages from having a higher expected 
valuation from government help and having made the first bid. This greatly reduces the 
incentives to enter for other potential bidders. 
  It can also be shown that the corrupt bidder is more likely to enter a two stage 
auction than an English auction, that is,  C V   is smaller than  1P ˆ V . Because other potential 
bidders are less likely to enter the two stage auction, the corrupt bidder sees less risk of 
losing the auction and thus is more motivated to enter a two stage auction (by posting a 
bid at the reserve price right after the auction starts) than an English auction.   
That the corrupt bidder is more likely but other potential bidders are less likely to 
enter a two stage auction implies that the corrupt bidder has a much better chance to win 
the land in a two stage auction than in an English auction. Since the corrupt government 
official can get the bribery income only if the corrupt developer wins, she would favor a 
                                                 
13 Since in both auctions equation (4) must hold, thus if  0 ˆ VV 1 − >   then  1 ˆˆ
p C VV > , and vice versa. Suppose 
(counterfactually)  0 ˆ VV − ≤ 
1 , then it can be shown that the left hand of equation (5) is less than that of 
equation (3), which yields a contradiction (since the right hands of two equations are the same) . 
  16two stage auction if she cares about her corruption income sufficiently.
14 Therefore, if the 
government official is more corrupt, then she is more likely to choose a two stage 
auction. If she cares more about the fiscal revenue of the city, she is more likely to 
choose an English auction. Such “caring” of course will not in general be exogenous. One 
could consider the probability of corruption being detected and punished by government 
auditing and a penalty function, which may also depend on the tolerance of the local 
government for lost revenue. In such a context, English auctions are much more visible in 
the media and may be subject to greater scrutiny.  
With corruption, the role of hot versus cold properties also changes. Note that the 
probability of not having a non-corrupt bidder enter is 
1
1 ˆ (
N ) F V
−





−   in a two stage auction. Since  0 ˆ VV 1 − >   , the greater the number of potential 
bidders, N , the larger the difference in the likelihood that the corrupt bidder wins 
between the two auctions. Thus, motivated by helping her partner bidder win the auction, 
a corrupt government official prefers two stage auctions for hotter properties. Moreover, 
if the bribes which corrupt developers are willing to pay are related to their profits, 
corrupt government officials have additional incentives to assign hot properties to two 
stage auctions. Therefore, our analysis suggests positive selection on unobservables into 
two stage auctions under corruption.  
Other auction choice considerations  
In an auction setting like ours, collusion among bidders (a group of developer 
forming a bidding ring) is quite plausible. In the existing literature, scholars have studied 
collusion in other auction settings (e.g., McAfee and McMillian, 1992, Bajari and Ye, 
2003, and Athey, Levin and Seira, 2008).  While in China, a group of developers may be 
attempted to rig an auction, there are several reasons we don’t focus on it in this setting. 
First, the government’s focus on corruption in land markets has not been on collusive 
bidding, but rather on corruption among officials. In China it may be less appealing 
(more dangerous) for individuals to collude against the state per se, as opposed to 
involving local officials. Also in our context, there seems to be no reason why collusion 
                                                 
14 Moreover, if the bribery payment to the government official increases with the partner developer’s net 
profit, then they both are more likely to favor a two stage auction, since the price the corrupt developer 
pays is likely to be lower.  
  17among bidders would be more successful in a two stage auction than in an English 
auction, so collusion among bidders would not explain the substantial difference in the 
likelihood of non-competitive bidding between the two stage and English auctions 
observed in our data. Thus, it is unclear how the concern about collusion among bidders 
would affect the land bureau’s choice of auction format. As we show later, our 
instrumental variables that are related to corruption and city budget needs are strongly 
correlated with the choice of auction format and there is positive selection on 
unobservables into two stage auctions. It seems land bureau corruption is at the heart of 
any explanation of the positive selection. For these reasons we focus on corruption in this 
paper, and ignore the issue of bidder collusion.  
Another factor that may affect the comparison between English and two stage 
auctions is the riskiness of the land to be auctioned. For different properties, the variance 
of the private value components across bidders could differ. For a given reserve price, 
absent corruption, the land bureau might want to assign high variance properties to two 
stage auctions. The reason is that, when there is a fat left tail of the distribution of  i V ,  the 
solution to equation (1) may be quite large, resulting in a low chance of a sale in the 
English auction. Thus revenue-maximizing officials would choose two stage auctions for 
risky lands.  This would suggest that two stage auctions are associated with a higher 
probability of no sales; we observe the opposite in the data. Nevertheless, below we 
control for a number of observables which could be related to variance of valuations such 
as property type, size, and distance from the city center.  
One additional issue we choose to ignore is the sequence of land sales in a city. Our 
decision is based on the following considerations. First, while it is certainly true that 
developers can always bid on the next available land, land auctions differ from on-line 
auctions of staple goods in that land available for development in a particular city within 
a particular period of time is limited. Considering the heterogeneity of land and the 
heterogeneity of developers, a developer may not easily find many perfectly substitutable 
pieces of land and thus has to treat each auction seriously.  Second, it does not seem to us 
that the issue of the sequence of land sales would fundamentally change our arguments 
about auction choices with or without corruption. Thirdly, a formal modeling of the 
sequence of land auctions is clearly not tractable in our current framework. 
  18What we see in the data concerning potential signaling 
In our data, in general, we know only sales and reserve prices and nothing about the 
bidding process itself—sequence of bids and number of bidders. However for Beijing we 
have a sample of 195 two stage auctions, where we know the number of bidders as well 
as the date when the first bid is submitted. From that data we learn several things. First, 
and most critically from Table 1, bidders do not signal valuations. In all auctions with 
just one bidder, almost all bids are within 0.5% of reserve price. This is consistent with 
our corruption story, but inconsistent with the separating equilibrium of the two stage 
auction without corruption. Once we have 2 or more bidders then a spread develops. This 
is the basis for later defining whether an auction is competitive (has more than one 
bidder) or not, based on spread. Note auctions can be highly contested: in 26 of the cases 
with 3 or more bidders, there are reported to be over 65 bids in each of the auctions.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 show that, conditional on property characteristics, 
having a first day bidder reduces the number of bidders, despite the positive bias (having 
a first day bid, given 10 days to bid, should mechanically raise the expected number of 
bidders). Similarly, in columns 3 and 4, having a first day bidder makes it more likely 
that the auction will be non-competitive. Again this is consistent with the corruption 
story. But the effects in columns 3 and 4 are weak. It turns out that in Beijing sometimes 
properties are sold which, contrary to national policy on auctions, have not been cleared 
for redevelopment; and, in Beijing, we have good data on clearance or not. Not being 
cleared reduces the number of bidders and increases the chances of non-competition. 
Controlling for this variable with a sample size of 155, sharpens the first day bidder 
variable in both formulations, with t-statistics in columns 3 and 4 on the variable rising to 
1.99 and 1.83 respectively. 
 
3. The data and basic patterns 
For our econometric analysis, we have data for 15 cities from 2003-2007,
15  from the 
Land Bureau of China (or its branches at the city-level).
16  For each auction, the land 
                                                 
15 These are Xiamen, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Nanning, Changchun, Suzhou, Wuxi, Nanchang, Shenyang, 
Taiyuan, Chengdu, Tianjin, Hangzhou, Ningbo, and Chongqing. 
  19bureau provides detailed information and posts it on its official website www.landlist.cn. 
Information includes: the address, the area (in square meters), the use restriction 
(business, residential, mixed), the type of auction, the reserve price, the sales price if the 
sale is complete, the post date which is the first date bids are accepted, the sale date, and 
the buyer’s identity. Sometimes additional information is given, such as the maximum 
floor-to-area ratio, the building-density, the green coverage rate, and whether the property 
is cleared or not. For some items including the last, explicit information is only provided 
in a limited number of cases.  
We also obtained the geo-economic characteristics of each piece of land for sale 
through bendi.google.com. Specifically, we locate each piece of land in the digital map of 
bendi.google.com using its street address. We then measure the line distance between the 
land and the CBD of the city where it is in. For the Chinese cities in the sample, we have 
no difficulty in identifying one central business district. We also create some dummy 
variables to indicate, whether within a 2.5 km. radius of the center of the property for 
sale, there is railway (including light rail and subway) or highway.  
Our base data consists of 4016 listings, where a listing is a property put up for 
auction whether the auction is completed and results in a sale, or not. Our 4016 listings 
exclude industrial use land (about 7% of total listings). As in the USA, industrial land use 
has a low and highly variable unit price; regressions using USA data which examine the 
determinants of sales prices for industrial land have low explanatory power (DiPasquale 
and Wheaton, 1996). More critically in China, such properties are often sufficiently far 
from the city center stretching into peri-urban areas, that we couldn’t get location 
characteristics from bendi.google.com.  
Of the 4016 listings, 607 remain unsold. Another 1107, while sold, do not have 
information on either reserve price or sales price, or both. We focus on the remaining 
2302 which are completed auctions with full price information. In the Appendix we 
explore the effect of focusing just on this sample. Here we note some key findings from 
the Appendix. First, for properties that sell, those with full versus deficient price 
information have similar unit and reserve sales prices where information does exist on 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 We exclude Shanghai, Beijing and Nanjing.  Shanghai has no English auctions; Beijing has 1; and 
Nanjing 3 (which are a tiny fraction of sales). In all specifications we utilize city fixed effects, so within 
city variation in the data (in particular in auction formats which is our focus) is essential. 
  20one or the other and only differ in observables in two minor ways: properties without full 
price information tend to be older listings and nearer the city center. The differences in 
samples for sales with full versus limited price information seem to be “innocent.”  
However, unsold properties compared to our working sample of 2302 show distinct 
differences. For example, unsold properties are more likely to have been offered at 
English auction potentially evidence of positive selection into two stage auctions; and, 
not surprisingly, to have been listed more recently. In terms of sales dates, we suspect 
unsold properties (i.e., those which didn’t sell 10 days after posting) are eventually 
removed from public listing on the internet, perhaps rebundled, and then relisted, which 
makes statistical analysis of sale versus no sale difficult, since we don’t know which 
properties are being offered for the first versus second time. 
 
Differences across auction types  
Table 3 is summary of basic statistics about the data, for completed transactions by 
auction type. In Part a, compared to English auctions, two stage auctions have 
significantly lower mean unit sales prices and are significantly less likely to sell 
competitively (have a spread greater than 1.005). However they have no significant 
difference in unit sales price, conditional on a competitive sale. This suggests that the 
main effect of two stage auctions is to affect price by deterring entry and competition.  
We note two stage auctions have a greater proportion of commercial properties. 
However, we decided that whether a property was designated as commercial was not an 
element on which we wanted to focus. As Part b of the table reveals, commercial relative 
to residential and mixed use (which are fairly similar) properties are more likely to be 
sold through two stage auction and without competition (60% sold non-competitively 
versus 40% for residential and mixed use). However unit sales prices across uses are 
similar, both for those that are sold competitively and for those that are not.   
 
4. Baseline effect of auction type on sales prices 
In this section we explore the overall effect of auction type on unit sales prices. As we 
will see in Sections 5 and 6, we are in essence estimating a reduced form price equation. 
Based on the conceptual section, consider the specification 
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      ln ln ( , , ) sale price commonvalue f potentialnumberof bidders auctiontype e =+     
(6) 
This specification follows the notion that there is a common value component to any 
bidders’ valuation. Given this common value, ex ante sales price then depends on the 
number of potential bidders and potentially the auction format, with the ex post sales 
price dependent on the actual drawings of private valuations (which   encapsulates). In 
the data, the potential number of bidders and certain determinants of the potential number 
of bidders (e.g. certain property characteristics) are unobserved. Choice of auction format 
may be related to these unobservables in one of two ways, which we hope to distinguish. 
In the absence of corruption, the land bureau might choose to sell “cold” properties by 
two stage auction, since, relative to an English auction, they may be more likely to draw 
in at least one bidder. This implies negative selection on properties sold by two stage 
auction. However two stage auctions may be more corruptible, and part of that may 
involve positive selection— setting aside the most “delectable morsels” for corrupt 
participants. 
e 
In equation (6), we assume reserve price is proportional to common value, with an 
added error component that is unrelated to any particulars of the sale (“evaluator error” in 
). As noted above, reserve price is set by an outside committee, using a formula based 
upon the valuation of the land parcel carried out by an independent private land appraiser. 
In that sense reserve price is an exogenous valuation of property based on observed and 
unobserved (to us) aspects of the property and general local market conditions. For the 
same common values to two different properties, the number of potential bidders will 
vary with the city in question (number of active land developers, controlled below by city 
and time fixed effects) and aspects of the property. For example, the potential number of 
bidders may differ for certain types of uses or properties near or further from the city 
center.  
e 
We implement equation (6) with  
 
          ln ln ijt ijt ijt ijt j t ijt sale price ask price X d D u β δε =+ + + +  +                 (7) 
  22for property i in city j which is sold at time t.  X  ’s are observed property characteristics 
such as use restriction, area, and distance to the city center. Auction type,  , is whether 
the land bureau chooses a two stage auction (=1) or not (=0), so that D is the effect of 
auction type on sales price, which we would like to identify.  The dummy terms 
ijt d
j u  and 
t δ  capture city and yearn fixed effects. The arguments in  ijt ε  are unobserved time-
varying city conditions or property characteristics, which controlling for common value 
(reserve price), may increase the number of potential bidders. These conditions may 
affect auction choice. The land bureau’s selection of properties into two stage auctions 
may involve either negative or positive selection, as noted above.  
4.1 Selection problem and instruments.  
To deal with the auction selection issue, for our baseline results, we estimate a Heckman 
(1978) endogenous dummy variable model, with a selection control function based on the 
inverse Mill’s ratio of a probit on auction type,
17 as well as the MLE version of that. Also 
we do IV estimation. We experimented with adding interactions of auction type with 
covariates to the IV specification, allowing auction effects to vary with covariates but the 
effects are not instructive, especially given we already have a reduced form 
specification.
18 Instrumental, or control function variables are ones which we think affect 
selection of auction type by the land bureau, but not sales values conditional on our 
covariates.   
We have several instruments which appear to influence choice of auction type. 
We generally use two sets of two instruments each. Most arise from a pattern in the data 
which is illustrated for the first set, as follows. In the month before a new party secretary 
takes office in a city, the land bureau switches more to using English auctions and then a 
month later it switches back, in fact switching away from English auctions (in effect, 
catching-up to its usual mix). We view this as the land bureau being cautious: “cleaning-
                                                 
17 The selection terms are respectively  ˆˆ () / () ijt ijt ZZ φγ γ Φ  and  ˆˆ () / ( 1() ijt ijt ZZ ) φγ γ −Φ - where  ˆ , ijt Z γ are the 
covariates and estimated parameters from the probit on auction type.  
18 We experimented with allowing treatment effects to vary with observables, by adding variables for 
auction type interacted with the deviation of property characteristics from their means. In OLS the 
interactions are not significant. In the IV (2SLS) results, the interactions are somewhat statistically stronger 
and the average treatment effect rises from -.53 (with 7 instruments) to -.81. However there is little 
variation in treatment responses as covariates go from low to high values. 
  23up” temporarily in the face of uncertainty about the new party secretary’s views on land 
market corruption; and then returning to business as usual. The same phenomenon occurs 
with the second set, land corruption cases, although the timing is different.  
We have the number of cases per month that relate to real estate corruption in any 
city j, reported on Google China. Such cases could involve the removal of a major local 
government official, the indictment of officials, the execution of officials, or a criminal 
investigation on land transactions. During this month when a case occurs, officials are 
more careful and schedule more English auctions. A month later they again revert and 
catch-up to business as usual. A few months after the case, a sanitized report on the case 
(the average is about .03 reports per city per month) is announced on state run news 
agencies and picked up by Google China. The announcements on Google China appear to 
occur 3 months after the case, in the sense that 3 months earlier English auctions jump 
up, followed in the next month by a drop down. 
We have two other types of instruments as well and use them in some robustness 
experiments. We have a source on corruption investigations more generally, which is the 
number of news reports per month by the main news agency in China, Xinhua, on 
corruption in any city j. Xinhua is a state run news agency. Our hypothesized scenario is 
the city government, the local party, or the National Audit Office conducts an enquiry 
into local corruption, of which the local land bureau is fully aware. Again, during this 
month, officials are more careful and schedule more English auctions. A month later they 
again revert and catch-up to business as usual. A couple of months after the investigation, 
Xinhua reports on the investigation (the average is about .9 reports per city per month). 
Thus English auctions increase 2 months before the month of the news report and 
decrease the next month. This timing of the pattern of one month up followed by one 
month down is found by experimentation in the data, but it is a clear pattern in all three 
situations—new party secretary, real estate corruption cases, and corruption 
investigations. 
Finally, we have a measure of the pressure on the land bureau to raise more 
money through land sales, coming from the city government. We measure the gap 
between budgetary expenditures of the cityE and on-the books revenueR.  An 
instrument would be the lagged growth in the relative deficit: 
  24111 22 () / ( ) / 2 jtj tj t j tj t j t ERR ERR −−− −− −− − − . With city fixed effects we would effectively be 
instrumenting with the lagged rate of change in this gap and are treating this growth rate 
as somewhat idiosyncratic and not connected to city demand conditions that would affect 
the current and future housing market (given city and year fixed effects). Higher lagged 
deficit growth rates induce more English auctions.  
In summary, in the tables in the paper, we use just the first two sets of 
instruments: party secretary change and real estate corruptions cases. Thus our vector of 
instruments Z  consists of dummy variables for any listing which occurs when a new 
party secretary takes office (one month lead and one month lag) and dummy variables for 
any listing which occurs when Google reports a land use corruption case (three months 
lead and two months lead). These are the strongest instruments; and the Google reporting 
of corruption is directly connected to real estate corruption. Growth in the relative city 
fiscal on-the-books deficit in the year before the listing is also a strong instrument at 
times but is potentially objectionable with only annual variation over 2003-2007 and the 
potential to be related to real estate prices.  We will report (the almost identical) results 
for key situations, using all 7 instruments. And for few experiments using sub-samples in 
the paper which are reported just in the text, we use all 7 instruments in order to have 
sufficient variations within sub-sample cities and time periods for instruments to have 
some strength. Next we examine the strength of the instruments and later we report 
results on tests of their validity.  
Choice of auction type 
Before turning to the sales price estimation we examine the choice of auction type, both 
to see the role of the instruments and to examine the choice itself. Results are in Table 4, 
for the situation where we include 4 instruments and where we include all 7. The effect of 
reserve price on auction type is essentially zero, which is consistent with the idea that 
reserve price setting is independent of auction choice. Choice of auction type is 
significantly influenced by land use, where the base case, commercial land, is much more 
likely to be sold in two stage auction, consistent with Table 3. Commercial land consists 
of smaller plots, which may be of more interest to specialized neighborhood developers 
within the city and may have fewer potential bidders. Also, more likely to be sold at two 
  25stage auction is land near rails (probably land urbanized in the Maoist era) but not near 
highways (land urbanized more recently).  
Of particular interest is how instruments influence auction choice. In column 1, 
the variables for the change in party secretary and for announcements of land corruption 
cases have the hypothesized patterns and are generally significant. In column 2 the other 
three instruments have the hypothesized effects as well. For four instruments the F-
statistic based on the change in the value of the LLF from adding instruments to the 
probit is 8.1. This is not as high as one would like, but it is reasonable in a context where 
we have city fixed effects. Going to seven instruments lowers the 1
st stage F-statistic, one 
reason for settling on four instruments.   
4.2 Sales Price Results 
Sales price results are in Table 5. In all specifications, a 1% increase in reserve price 
raises sales price by just over 0.9%. Why is the elasticity less than 1? A higher reserve 
price also contains an effect to discourage entry of potential bidders (where we assume 
appraisers set a reserve price that is common value plus an idiosyncratic error 
component). Property characteristics are interpreted to affect the number of potential 
bidders, conditional on reserve price. Sales prices are distinctly lower for larger plots 
which may be less manageable, or have fewer experienced developers who would try to 
utilize them.  
The key variable concerns choice of auction type. In OLS estimation, prices are 
lower for two stage auctions by 17%, as an assumed average effect. With correction for 
selection, the coefficient has a much larger negative value. The Heckman MLE estimate 
is about -0.70, about 4 times larger in absolute value. The IV coefficient (standard error) 
when the first stage simply uses the 4 instruments (i.e., linear probability) is similar, -.646 
(.267) for LIML. Coefficients are fairly precisely estimated. While the Heckman MLE is 
the preferred specification, we note the result is sensitive to some alternatives: the  2-step 
Heckman estimate which is less efficient and the LIML estimate with predicted 
  26probabilities from a first stage Probit as instruments yield coefficients that are smaller in 
magnitude: -.40. These are still at least twice the OLS estimate.
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In terms of issues of selection, the fact that the treatment effect coefficients are 
significantly larger than under OLS suggests positive selection: not accounting for 
selection understates the size of the treatment effect. Correspondingly, for direct evidence 
on selection, the correlation coefficient in the MLE results is positive and significant, as 
is the 2-step Heckman estimate of the Mills’ ratio coefficient. The theory section 
suggested positive selection would be a marker of corruption, and the results indicate that 
positive selection into two stage auctions is a significant force. 
We also examined the validity of instruments to the extent any tests are 
persuasive. A Sargan p-value of .15 while acceptable is low. We believe this is due to 
model specification error (see next) rather than unsuitability of instruments per se. If we 
add to column 1 (the OLS specification) our 4 instruments as covariates, the coefficient 
on auction type goes from -.1697 to -.1624, a tiny change. If instruments were correlated 
with unobservables affecting sale prices, assuming that auction type is correlated with 
unobservables, the added instruments should absorb some of the correlation of 
unobservables with auction type, affecting its coefficient. That the coefficient is 
unchanged and instruments are definitely correlated with auction type suggests that the 
instruments are orthogonal to unobservables.  
Finally, we note if we drop the reserve price variable and use property 
characteristics (and city and time fixed effects) to represent both common value and 
demand considerations, all coefficients become much more negative.
20 For example, the 
OLS coefficient goes from -.17 (with a reserve price control) to -.34 (without a reserve 
price control); the Heckman 2-step and MLE rise in absolute value to -.81 and -.92 
respectively; and the LIML coefficient goes to -.80.  The lambda in the Heckman 2-step 
rises to .27, while the rho in the Heckman MLE falls to .37. Thus, the results without a 
reserve price control also suggest positive selection.  
                                                 
19 With use of all 7 instruments, the MLE and 2-step Heckman results are almost the same (-.69 and -.46 
respectively). The LIML estimates are higher in absolute value when using either a first stage probit or 
linear probability model (-.526 and -.893 respectively). All coefficients are significant.  
20 These reported results are for 7 instruments. 
  274.4 The problem with the baseline approach: “Kink/discontinuity” in the price 
equation 
We speculate that if multiple entrants emerge in the second stage of a two stage 
auction, the outcomes for English and two stage auctions for that property will be similar. 
In both cases once into the English auction portion, the sales price will simply be the 
valuation of the second highest valuation bidder. Corruption more likely takes the form of 
inducing non-corrupt entrants to stay out of the two stage auction, with the result that 
sales are at reserve prices. Of the 2302 auctions upon which estimation is based, only 
1235 are ex post competitive, or have more than one bidder as inferred from the degree of 
spread. A non-competitive auction means sales price equals reserve price, so reserve 
price tells us sales price. We already saw in Table 3 from the raw data that the significant 
overall unit price differences between English and two stage auctions for the overall 
sample become insignificant once we look just at auctions which are competitive. 
  To explore these issues, we examine the two components. How does auction type 
affect the probability that an auction will be competitive or not? Second, if auctions are 
competitive does the choice of auction format still affect sales price? The answers to 
these questions will help us study the revenue losses from use of two stage auctions.  
 
5. The effect of auction type on competition 
What is the effect of auction type, on whether an auction will be competitive or not, 
defined as whether there appears to be more than one bidder because spread exceeds 
1.005? A simple probit of competitive or not with auction type as a potentially 
endogenous dummy variable faces the same selection problem as in the sales price 
estimation. Properties may be negatively or positively selected into two stage auctions, 
and such selection itself will affect the potential for competition. The literature handles 
this in different ways. We use the bivariate recursive probit (Greene, 1998, Evans and 
Schwab, 1995), as an MLE solution. As a robustness check we also performed regular IV 
estimation in a linear probability model (Angrist, 1999), where we instrument for auction 
type with Z’s.  Here, the marginal 2-stage auction effects are even stronger than we will 
report below—reducing the probability of competition by .75.
21  
                                                 
21 These results are based on use of  7 instruments, under LIML estimation. 
  28The bivariate recursive probit is a two equation MLE model where we model 
action type as a dummy endogenous variable which is a function of X and Z , with 
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where  denotes whether an auction is two-stage (1), or not (0), and denotes whether 
an auction is competitive (1) or not (0). The X’s include city fixed effects, time dummies, 
seasonal dummies, and ln(ask price) in all equations (cf, equation 7). The recursive 
structure allows identification in a standard bivariate probit framework (Greene, 1998). In 
the next section we will add a continuous equation, for sales price in competitive 
auctions; at that point we will offer more details on estimation.   
ijt d ijt s
Results are in Table 6. For the bivariate recursive probit, we show marginal direct 
and indirect effects. For the variable of interest, two stage auction, there is only a direct 
auction effect. In the ordinary probit, the marginal effect of two stage auction on the 
probability of being competitive is -.34, consistent with the raw data in Table 3. In the 
bivariate recursive formulation that marginal effect is 26% stronger, at -.43.
22 This is 
again suggestive of positive selection into two stage auctions: the two stage auction’s 
negative effect on competition is understated because properties with better 
unobservables are selected into two stage auctions. Consistent with this, the rho 
measuring the degree of correlation between the error terms is positive (.38), and 
significant. Properties with better unobservables are more likely to be competitive, and 
more likely to be assigned to two stage auction. 
In terms of other variables, relative to the base case of commercial use, sales of 
residential and mixed use land are likely to be more competitive, while large properties 
                                                 
22  Use of 7 instruments further increases the strength of the negative effect to -.49. 
  29away from the city center are less likely to have competitive bidding. Total marginal 
effects on competition or not include direct effects
23 and then indirect effects
24 through 
the effect of covariates on auction type and hence competition. Indirect effects seem 
strongest for land use variables, reinforcing the fact that commercial use properties face 
fewer takers and are less likely to be competitive. Removal of reserve price as a covariate 
in both equations has little effect on results, consistent with the fact that its coefficient is 
insignificant in Table 6.    
 
6. Effect of auction format on sales prices, for competitive sales 
If properties sell competitively, is there a remaining effect of auction type on sales price? 
A naive way of looking at this is to ask, conditional on a property selling competitively, 
ex post does auction type affect price for such properties? That is interesting information. 
If we examine the sample of 1235 properties for which spread exceeds 1.005, OLS results 
in column 1 of Table 8 below show no effect of auction type, a coefficient of -.03.  
This OLS estimate of auction effect on price faces two problems. First there is the auction 
selection problem discussed earlier, but now there is a second selection issue. Being 
competitive is endogenous, and there is selection on unobservables into competition that 
are surely correlated with price. Such selection is mediated by the auction process, so it is 
not the standard problem in Lee, Maddala and Trost (1980), but rather one modeled in the 
labor literature (Fraker and Moffitt 1988, Goux and Maurin, 2000) and more recently in 
firm growth models (Reize, 2001). 
     We tackle the problem in two ways. First, as a less parametric approach, we 
utilize the ideas from the literature on identification-at-infinity (Heckman, 1990), by 
examining auction effects for samples where the predicted probability of a non-
competitive sale is small. This isolates a sample where, ex ante, we expect sales to be 
                                                 
23 Marginal direct effects are calculated based on the estimated coefficients in the second equation of the 
bivariate recursive probit, as well as  the predicted probability of being competitive at the mean level of 
covariates, i.e., P=0.4817.  For a continuous variable, its marginal effect is equal to the product of the 
density of normal distribution at P=0.4817 and its estimated coefficient.  For a discrete variable,  its 
marginal effect is equal to  (arg (0.4817) ) 0.4817 θ ΦΦ + − , where  () Φ ⋅  (or arg () Φ ⋅ ) is  the cdf  (or inverse 
of cdf ) of  the normal distribution and  θ is the estimated coefficient. 
24The marginal indirect effect of each covariate is obtained from the product of the estimated coefficient of 
2-stage auction in the second equation of the biprobit regression and the estimated coefficient of this 
covariate on auction type in the first equation.   We calculate the standard errors using the delta method 
approach.  The variance-covariance matrix is obtained through post-estimation of the biprobit model.  
  30competitive regardless of auction type; and asks whether, for this sample, there is an 
effect on sales price of two stage auctions. The main issue with moving to such samples 
is that, especially when we want to still correct for selection into auction type, we start to 
run out of cities which have competitive sales in both auction formats. 
6.1 Selection into being competitive 
Identification-at-infinity 
Similar to Mulligan and Rubinstein (2007), for each auction type separately, we 
estimate the probability that an auction is competitive; specifically that the spread (ratio 
of sales to reserve price) is greater than 1.005. The covariates are the X’s including 
reserve price and city fixed effects, but not the instruments (which don’t affect 
competition per se). We then created different samples: for example all properties where 
the probability of competition ex ante is predicted to be greater than 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, and so 
on.  Patterns in the raw data are most instructive in terms of how the samples, mix of 
competitive to non-competitive auctions, and price differences change across auction 
types as we move to more and more competitive margins.  
Table 7 shows the patterns. In Table 7 we distinguish 7 samples, all observations 
and then 6 samples distinguished by increasing degrees of predicted competitiveness of 
the auctions. We have three sets of columns. In the first we show that as the degree of 
predicted competitiveness increases, the ratio of (remaining) two-stage to English 
auctions declines precipitously. For the full sample the ratio is 2.6; for the most 
competitive it is 0.06. The result suggests that finding a sufficient sample of two stage 
auctions that are very likely to be competitive is not easy. The second set of columns 
shows that as we increase the margin on being competitive, the percentage of auctions 
with spread rises and converges for the two auction types. This of course follows from 
the nature of the exercise (creating samples by how competitive they are predicted to be); 
but it shows the exercise is working.  
The third set of columns in Table 7 contains the key results. It examines the 
pattern of spread (sales to reserve price) for English versus two stage auctions. 
Significant differences in both median and ranks of spread exist at low levels of 
competition between the two auction types, but diminish as competition increases and 
disappear by a predicted probability of competition in excess of 0.7. Typically, for 
  31identification-at-infinity, a margin of .8 or greater is used. The raw data suggest that at 
such margins, English and two stage auctions yield similar outcomes.  
We then attempted to implement this idea econometrically, by looking at sales 
which ex ante are “almost certain” to be competitive. The difficulty is that as we make 
the margin of competition more intensive, we get fewer and fewer two stage auctions in 
the sample, so there are fewer and fewer cities left in the sample which use both auction 
types. Second our instruments loose their power and degree of variation as the sample 
shrinks and what we report is the best case—use of all 7 instruments. So, for example, 
even if we cut at the probability of being competitive at a relatively low level such as 0.7, 
the first stage probit drops all but 3 instruments (lack of variation in instruments under 
city and time fixed effects). And rather than a sample of 715 for sales where the 
probability of competition exceeds .7 (Table 7), we must work with a sample of 541 in 
terms of cities which still use both auction types. The improvement in the LLF from 
adding these instruments has a 
2 χ - statistic of 2.09 which falls far short of the critical 
value of 7.8 with 3 degrees of freedom, and the corresponding F-statistic is tiny. If we cut 
finer in terms of increased degree of competition, we loose most variation in instruments 
and the problem is worse.  
The best we can do is cut at the margin of the probability of competition 
exceeding .6, which definitely falls short of identification-at-infinity. For these sales we 
have a sample 792 (out of possible 912 from Table 7) where 9 cities still have both 
auction types. While all 7 instruments have variability in the sample, the improvement in 
the LLF for the first stage probit on auction type of adding the instruments is now 
significant (
2 χ - statistic of 28.5) but the implied F- statistic indicates weak instruments. 
For this sample, in the same type of price equation as used in Table 5, the coefficient on 
auction type under MLE Heckman estimation is -.31 and significant. There is no 
evidence of selection into auction type: rho equals .028 (and is insignificant) and the OLS 
coefficient is close to the Heckman one at -.29. The effect of auction type is now much 
smaller than the -.70 in Table 5, but it is not zero. Unfortunately we can’t use this 
approach to tease out the effect when we are at the margin of properties which are 
“almost certain” to sell competitively, to see if the effect goes to zero.  Thus we turn to 
the more traditional parametric approach.  
  326.2 MLE estimation of the bivariate selection into competitive, two-stage auctions  
To the model in equations (8) – (11), we now add a third equation for price 
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so as to estimate the parameter set  ( ) uv u v D εεε β αθγσ ρ ρ ρ Θ= . The LLF is 
footnoted and uses results in Genz (2004).
25
  We estimate the model by MLE, which yields more efficient estimates than a two 
step approach that adds two control functions to the price equation to deal with the two 
dimensions of selection; the two-step approach also has a cumbersome standard error 
calculation (Reize, 2001).
26 In Table 8, column 2, we present the results for the price 
equation, along with the covariance structure. Estimates for the discrete choice part are in 
the three-equation MLE Appendix. For comparison in the Appendix, we also report the 
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26 We thank Frank Reize for access to his STATA code on MLE estimation of the model, to check ex post 
against our STATA code, although in the end we reprogrammed the model in MATLAB. There seems to 
be a minor error in Reize (2001) in specification of the LLF. 
 
  33corresponding bivariate recursive probit estimates from which Section 5 and Table 6’s 
marginal effects are calculated. The two sets of coefficients are very close. 
Results on the price equation in Table 8, column 2 are similar to the OLS 
estimates without any sample corrections. The coefficient for the auction type effect on 
price in competitive auctions is fairly close to zero and insignificant, as hypothesized.
27 
In the covariance structure, as before, there is strong positive selection into two-stage 
auctions. The error term on the price equation has low correlation with the error terms on 
the discrete events.  
Summary.  Whether we approach the problem as a parametric one with strong 
assumptions or use a more non-parametric approach (identification at infinity on raw 
price data or in a price equation with auction selection), it seems that, once auctions 
become competitive, price is not affected by auction format. Auction format matters at 
the margin of whether auctions are competitive or not, all consistent with the corruption 
signaling hypothesis associated with two stage auctions  
6.3 Review gains from switching to English auctions 
  What are the revenue gains if one was to require properties sold at two-stage 
auction to be sold at English auction, assuming that would solve the problem of potential 
corruption between the auctioneer and partner bidders. In our data the actual revenue 
from properties sold at two-stage auctions is 239.6 billion Yuan or about $34.2 billion. 
This is modestly higher than the expected revenue for these properties which is predicted 
from the estimated model, indicating the issue with mediating unit sales price predictions 
by lot sizes to get sales revenue per property. This predicted revenue if these properties 
are still sold at two-stage auction is 227.7 billion Yuan, about 5% lower than the actual. 
The unit sales price calculation is based on the predicted probability of selling 
competitively if sold at two-stage auction (prob( 1 1 ijt ijt sd = = ) times the predicted 
price if sold competitively, plus the predicted probability of selling non-competitively at
two-stage auction times the reserve price. The predicted price if sold competitivel
 
y is 
                                                 
27 The results are the same if we use 7 instruments. 
  34calculated from the usual price equation adjusted for the two selection terms as footnoted 
(using parameters from the MLE estimation).
28  
We compare the revenue from selling properties by two stage auctions with the 
predicted revenue obtained if all properties sold by two stage auctions in the data were 
sold at English auctions. This is the predicted probability of these properties selling 
competitively if switched to English auction times the predicted price when sold 
competitively, plus the predicted probability of not selling competitively if switched to 
English auction times the reserve price. The predicted probability of selling competitively 
is enhanced by the treatment effect of English auction on competition.
29 The predicted 
revenue is 299.6 billion Yuan. This is 25% higher than the actual revenue and 32% 
higher than the model predicted revenue if sold by two-stage auction. Thus, use of two-
stage auction with the associated reduction in degree of competition (through potentially 
signaling a corrupt sale) deprives cities of significant revenues.  
  This gain in revenue is illustrated in Figure 3, which for two-stage auctions 
compares the predicted unit price in the model if sold by two-stage auction, with that if 
sold by English auction. The 45
o line is for model predicted prices if sold still at two-
stage auction, while the scatter plot of points is for the predicted prices if these properties 
were sold by English auction. The difference reflects both the increase in probability of 
selling competitively for any property, as well as the fact that these properties have 
relatively good unobservables which enhances their competitive price.     
                                                 
ˆ ˆ
28 The price equation is  ,, ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ijt ijt ijt u ijt u ijt yX d D c c ε νε ν β σ =+ + + σ , where  are the predicted values for 
the expressions 






[( ) ] / ( 1 )
[] i f   
[,, ]
[( ) ] / ( 1 )
[] i f  
[, , ]
ijt ijt u ijt ijt u
u ijt ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt ijt u
ijt ijt u ijt ijt u
ijt ijt











λγ ρ α θ ρ
φα θ
αθ λ γ ρ
λγ ρα θ ρ
φα θ
αθ λ γ ρ
Φ+ − + −
=+ =
Φ+ +
Φ+ − + −
=− −








[( ) ] / ( 1 )
[] i f   
[,, ]




ijt ijt u ijt ijt u
v ijt ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt ijt u
ijt ijt u ijt ijt u
ijt ijt











αθ ρλ γ ρ
φλ γ
αθ λ γ ρ








Φ− − + + −
=+
Φ− − + −








29 Let us denote the probability of selling competitively under the switch as prob[ 1| 1, ' 0] ijt ijt ijt sdd === . 
Then  ( )
-1 ˆ prob[ 1| 1, ' 0] (prob[ 1| 1]) ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt sdd sd γ === = Φ Φ == − . 
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7. Summary 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate empirically corruption 
in auctions beyond simple price-fixing among bidders, to allow corrupt auctioneers and 
signaling activity. This complements the recent increased interest in the theoretical 
literature on corruption in auctions (see, e.g., Burguet and Che, 2004, Compte, O., A. 
Lambert-Mogiliansky and T. Verdier, 2005, Menezes and P. K. Monteiro, 2006). But our 
paper differs also from this theoretical literature. Corruption in our context takes the form 
of auction choice, while these theoretical papers consider corruption in a given auction 
format. Another difference is that both English and two stage auctions are open (that is, 
all bids are observable to all participants), while the existing literature considers first 
price sealed bid auctions (so that the corrupt auctioneer can manipulate bids).  
  In this setting, we show that after controlling for observable land characteristics 
(and location and time trends), two stage auctions lead to less competitive bidding and 
thus substantially smaller revenue than English auction in China’s land market. We 
further demonstrate that land bureau officials in Chinese cities divert hotter properties to 
two stage auctions that are more corruptible. Since urban land in large Chinese cities is 
hugely valuable and revenue from land auctions accounts for a large portion of city fiscal 
revenue, such corruption activities result in large losses of potential public funds. And the 
losses from this type of corruption are not merely transfers from city coffers to the 
corrupt officials and developers. This type of corruption also leads to misallocations, as 
honest developers with higher valuations are deprived of the chances to develop the land. 
    
 
 
   
  36     Appendices 
Theory appendix:  
 
1.  Characterizing a separating equilibrium of a two stage auction without 
corruption 
First we argue that bidder 1 with  10 , V[ v V ∈ )  will not enter the auction at all. Consider a 
bidder 1 whose valuation is just below but very close to V  . In equilibrium he does not 
enter and all other potential bidders understand that his valuation is below V  . So other 
bidders enter the English auction if their valuation is above  ˆ
NS V . Thus, if this bidder 1 
deviates from the equilibrium and enters the English auction at the end, his expected 
payoff will be no more than 
1 ˆ N
NS F(V ) (V r) C
− − −  , which will be less than zero by 
Equation (2) since  ˆ . NS S V< V ( V )   
Now we consider the case when  1 VV ≥  . If bidder 1 enters in stage 1 with a bid 
1 B , the other potential bidders can infer bidder 1’s valuation  11 V> B+ C r + C ≥  from his 
bidding schedule  1 B(V ). Except for this, the same game is played by the other  1 N −  
potential bidders as in the case of an English auction. Exactly as before, the valuation 
threshold for entry in this case can be solved as  11 ˆˆ 1, . S V( V) = V ( V, C ,N V ) −  Since  1 V> r, 
we have  11 ˆˆ ˆ 1, 1, . S NS V (V )=V(V ,C, N V)>V(r,C, N V)=V −− ˆ  The difference between 
these entry threshold valuations reflects the entry deterrence effect of bidder 1’s 
signaling.  
For  1 V [V,V] ∈  , if bidder 1 makes a bid of B  and is believed by the other 
potential bidders as having a valuation of  1 V
G
, his expected payoff is  
  
1
11 1 1 ˆ N




Clearly this payoff function is increasing in bidder 1’s true valuation 1 V  and the belief of 
the other potential bidders  1 V
G
, but decreasing in his bid B . 
In equilibrium, bidder 1 should “tell the truth” by bidding his equilibrium bid 
1 B(V ), which reveals to the other potential bidders that his true type is  1 V . For a strictly 
monotonic bidding schedule to satisfy this truth-telling constraint (or incentive 
compatibility constraint), bidder 1’s above expected payoff function must satisfy the 
single crossing condition, so lower valued bidders have no incentive to misrepresent their 
valuations. It can be checked that this condition is indeed satisfied, because the slope of 
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is clearly increasing in  1 V .  
  37From the truth-telling constraint, we can derive the differential equation that 
characterizes the strictly increasing bidding schedule as follows: 
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From equation (1) and  11 ˆˆ 1, S V( V) = V ( V, C ,N V ) − , we can use the implicit function 
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. 
Together with the boundary condition that B(V)= r   (the lowest type uses the lowest 
possible signal), the equation (a) characterizes the strictly increasing signaling schedule.   
 
2.   Comparing the English and two stage auctions without corruption: a numerical 
example 
Because a general comparison of the expected revenue between English and two stage 
auctions is too difficult, we use a simple numerical example to show that the expected 
revenue is higher for an English auction than for a two stage auction when the land is 
“hot,” and vice versa. We normalize parameters by setting 0 0, C=1 v = . Let  =2 r . 
Consider the case of  2 N = , and each bidder’s valuation is uniform on [0, ] V , where  
3 Vr C >+ =. A cold property occurs when V  is relatively small, while the property is 
hot when  V  is relatively large.  
  For an English auction, from equation (1) it can be shown that the entry threshold 
valuation is 
2 ˆ 0.5 (0.25 ) Vr r C V =+ +
0 . 5 . The probability of no entry (hence no sale) is  
2 ˆ () VV  ; the probability of only one bidder entering is 
2 ˆˆ 2( ) VV V V − , in which case the 
land will be sold at the reserve price. The probability of competitive bidding is 
2 2 ˆ () VV V − , in which case the expected revenue is the expected lower valuation of the 
two bidders (by revenue equivalence with the second price auction).  
  For the two stage auction, we have two scenarios: low valuation scenario and high 
valuation scenario. The low valuation scenario occurs when  2 Vr C ≤+ ; then bidder 2 
will not enter at all as long as bidder 1 has entered. So bidder 1’s entry threshold 
valuation is Vr C =+  , and if he does not enter, bidder 2 will enter if his valuation is 
above rC + . In this scenario, the probability of no entry (no sale) is 
2 () rC V +
2 ; the 
probability of only one bidder entering is 
2 1( ) rC V −+
2 , in which case the sales price is 
the reserve price. Note that in this low valuation scenario there will be no competitive 
bidding.  
  In the high valuation scenario of the two stage auction ( 2 Vr C >+ ), if bidder 1 
does not enter, then bidder 2 should enter with a bid at the reserve price when 
2 ˆ
NS VV r C ≥= + . If bidder 1 enters with a signaling bid, bidder 2 will enter only if his 
  38valuation  21 1 ˆ () S VV V VC ≥= + . From equation (2), it can be shown that bidder 1’s entry 
threshold valuation is given by 
2 0.5( ) [0.25( ) ] Vr c r C C V =− + + +  0 . 5 . In this scenario, 
the probability of no entry (no sale) is 
2 () Vr C V +  .  There are two cases that result in 
only one bidder entering: (i) bidder 1 enters with a signaling bid and bidder 2 does not 
enter, which happens with probability of 
2 [( )(0.5 0.5 ) 0.5 ] VV V VC C V −+ + −  2  and with 
a sales price equal to bidder 1’s signaling bid; and (ii) bidder 1 does not enter and bidder 
2 enters with a bid at the reserve price, which happens with probability of 
2 () VV r C V −−  . The remainder of the probability goes to the case of competitive 
bidding.  
  To see that a revenue maximizing auctioneer prefers a two stage auction over an 
English auction for cold properties, consider first the low valuation scenario when V  is 
close to  2 rC + . In our numerical example, this means that  2 Vr C4 ≈ += . Then in an 
English auction the entry threshold is  3.24 V ≈  , the probability of no sale is about 0.656, 
the probability of one bidder entering is about 0.308 and that of competitive bidding is 
less than 0.04. Since the sales price in competitive bidding is less than 4, the expected 
revenue is no more than 0.776. For a two stage auction, the probability of no sales is 
0.563, and the probability of having one bidder enter is 0.438. Thus, the expected revenue 
of a two stage auction is 0.875, higher than that of an English auction.  Because the 
expected revenue is continuous inV , we conclude that for cold properties a two stage 
auction generates greater expected revenue than an English auction. 
Now consider the other extreme case in which V  is large, e.g.,  24 V = . Then in 
an English auction the entry threshold is  ˆ 6 V = , the probability of no sale is 0.0625, the 
probability of one bidder entering is 0.375 and that of competitive bidding is 0.563. It can 
be shown that the total expected revenue of an English auction is 7.5.  For a two stage 
auction, the threshold valuation for bidder 1 is 5.62 and the probability of no sale is about 
0.03. The probability of only bidder 2 entering is about 0.205, generating an expected 
revenue of 0.41.  From the preceding Appendix, bidder 1’s signaling bidding function is 
2
1 (0.5 2.55) ( 1) BV V =− 1 +  starting at  2 Br = =  when  1 5.62 VV ==  . It can be checked 
that the event of only bidder 1 entering generates an expected revenue of about 3.88, and 
the event of competitive bidding generates an expected revenue of  2.99.  Thus, the total 
expected revenue of a two stage auction is 7.28, which is less than that of an English 
auction.  
  
3.  The snapping strategy by a non-corrupt developer does not work: an example  
We continue with the example of uniform distribution on [0, ] V . Suppose κ is 
sufficiently large so that other bidders will not enter if they see a bid at the reserve price 
at the start of the auction. Suppose a non-corrupt bidder plays the snapping strategy by 
mimicking the corrupt bidder when his valuation is aboveV

.  We consider the bidder 




which happens with  
* ˆ [0.5( ) ] p pV =

ns a pay
V C V κ − − + . With the remainder 
probability, he succeeds and obtai off of VrC − −

. Thus, playing the snapping 
strategy yields an expected payoff of 
* (1 )( ) p Vr C − −−

. If he plays the equilibrium 
  39strategy of waiting t re is a corrupt developer who submits a bid at 
reserve price at the start of the auction, a non-corrupt bidder with valuation 
o see whether the
V

 obtains an 
expected payoff of (1 ) ( ) p UV −

, where  ( ) UV

 is his expected payoff in the two sta
out corru . Note that when 
ge 
auction with ption p is close to one and κ is large, 
* p is c







Comparing the estimating sample with samples of unsold properties  
and properties with incomplete information 
  I. Base 
sample 
II. Unsold
N = 607 
III. Sold: 
missing price 







* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level or higher 
 
The table above explores the differences in means of variables for the estimating sample 
versus other listings. A comparison of columns I and II (with tests of differences given in 
column IV) suggests unsold properties are more distant from the CBD with a lower 
reserve price; and are more likely to have been offered at English auction. A probit of 
auction type on sold or not, with controls for property characteristics including reserve 
price and city and year fixed effects, suggests two stage auctions have a .076 higher 
probability of a sale. A comparison of columns I and III (with tests of differences given 
in column V) suggests sales with missing sale or reserve price data are similar to those in 
our estimating sample. They have similar auction type and use proportions and when data 








.72 .61 .69  5.11  1.66 
Area (sq. m.)  54861 54113 53831  -.09  .25 
Distance (km.)  19.3 46.4 13.4  -13.6  7.68 
Unit sale price 
(10,000 Y) 
.62 n.a .58  (n=824)  n.a.  .53 
Unit reserve 
price (10, 000 Y) 
.37  .21   .31 (n=200)  5.01  .50 
Mixed use  .38 .52 .39  -6.03 -.54 
Commercial use  .31 .27 .28  1.99  1.76 
Residential use  .31 .21 .33  4.99  -1.14 
No. quarters 
since listing till 
Dec. 2007 
8.17 4.74 9.31  19.8  -6.25 
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MLE appendix. 
iscrete choice results. 3-equation MLE compared with 2-equation bivariate probit 
  petition equation 

















(3-eq. model) [2 
stage auction or 








  n.a.    
Ln (reserve price)  -.137  -.137  -.057 
(.061) 
-.058 
(.061)  (.110)  (.109) 
Dummy: 
l use 


































Dummy:  rail 









Dummy:  highway     



















n.a. n.a.  .803**  .800** 
turnover, 1 mont
lag 




n.a. n.a.  -.670**  -.678* 
Land corruptio
case, 3 month lead
(.336)  (.367) 
Google report, 
Land corruptio
case, 2 month lead
n 
  
n.a. n.a.  .974*  .959** 
(.525)  (.515) 
Season, year, city 
dummies 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  2297 2297  2297  2297 
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  43Figure 1. Distribution of unit sales prices by auction type 




















             Figure 2. Distribution of bid-reserve price ratio by auction type 





















  44Figure 3. For 2-stage auction sales: predicted unit price if sold by 2-stage (45
o line) 
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Predicted price if sold by 2-stage auction
E(y|d=1), baseline E(y|d=1,d'=0), switching to English auction
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Table 1. Beijing two stage auctions  
 
Number of bidders  Number of cases: Sales-
reserve price ratio ≤ 1.005 
Number of cases: Sales-
reserve price ratio > 1.005 
1 104  1 
2 3 6 
3 or more  0  75 
 
 
Table 2. Beijing count and spread estimations 
 




price ratio ≤ 1.005  
(marg. effects) 
Bidder on first day, or not 





























N  195  181 189 181 
Pseudo Rsq  .030  .200 .007 .101 
 
















  46Table 3. Data on auctions  
 
a) Two stage vs. English auctions 
 
 





Unit sales price (in 
10,000 yuan) 
.47 1.0  -.53  -2.64 
Proportion non-
competitive 
.574 .178  .396  -20.4 
Unit price if 
competitive (in 10, 
000 yuan) 
.73 (n =708)  1.13  (n = 527)  -.40  -1.62 
Area (in sq. meter)  55289.96 53751.1  1538.86  .30 
Distance to CBD (in 
km) 
19.9 17.8  2.1  1.86 
Commercial use  .38 .14  .24  13.3 
 
 






Mean (N= 1586) 
Difference t-stat. 
Unit sales price (in 
10, 000 yuan) 
.617 .615  .002  .026 
Unit price if 
competitive (in 10, 
000 yuan) 
.98  (n=289)  .88  (n=946)  .09  .55 
Area (in sq. meter)  31354.72 65473.59  -34118.87  -8.52 
Distance to CBD (in 
km) 
18.47 19.67  -1.20  -1.03 
Proportion two stage 
auction 
.88 .65  .23  13.17 
Proportion non-
competitive 
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Table 4. Two stage auction, or not
1 
































    
Lagged change in fiscal strain    -.544** 
(.236) 
Xinhua corruption report, 2 month 
lead from listing 
 -.016 
(.016) 
















Google report, Land corruption case, 





Google report, Land corruption case, 





Season, year, city dummies  Yes Yes 
N  2302 2302 
Pseudo Rsq  .37 .36 
Implied F-Stat: adding bottom panel 
instruments 
8.1 6.6 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% or higher level.  
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Table 5. Baseline Case:  Unite Sales Prices  [ln(sales price/area)] 
  OLS Heckman  IV 
     2-step  MLE  LIML 
Dummy: two stage 








(.112)    [(.225)] 










































Dummy: railway within 



















Season, year, city 
dummies 
Yes yes  yes yes 
N  2302 2302  2302 2302 
Rsq  .85   .84 
Lambda [rho] {Sargan 






* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level or higher. All standard errors (except in Heckman 2-
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Dummy:  rail within 







Dummy:  highway 







Season, year, city 
dummies 
Yes Yes  Yes 






Rsq  .22    
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level or higher. All standard errors are  






























Eng. Med  diff. 





all  1661 641 .43  .82  1.0  1.49  .000  .000 
Prob. comp. >0.5  590 574  .69  .85  1.17  1.51  .000  .000 
Prob. comp. >0.6  377 535  .74  .88  1.25  1.54  .000  .000 
Prob. comp. >0.7  212 503  .77  .90  1.39  1.56  .029  .017 
Prob. comp. >0.8  89 406  .78 .92  1.47  1.65  .360  .140 
Prob. comp.> 0.85  49 328  .84 .93  1.91  1.68  .348  .245   
Prob. comp.> 0.9  14 240  1  .95  1.84  1.83  .783  .991 
 
Table 8.  Sales prices: “Competitive” sales only 
All sales where spread > 1.0005 
  OLS  MLE (selection on  auction type 
and competition) (eqs. 7a – 11) 
























Dummy: there is railway 





Dummy: there is highway 





Season, year, city dummies  Yes Yes 
N  1235 1235 
ε σ    .510** 
(.060) 
uε ρ    .114 
(.437) 
νε ρ    .088 
(.212) 
uν ρ    .374** 
(.186) 
Rsq .82   
Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level or higher. OLS s.e.’s are robust, city clustered. 
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